ALDO: I’m here with Erwann Michel-Kerjan and Mike Useem, two of the three authors of Leadership Dispatches: Chile’s Extraordinary Comeback from Disaster. We’re here in Santiago, Chile where we’ve just attended a large gathering for the book. Erwann and Mike, my first question is, how was leadership put into practice after the massive earthquake that hit Chile on February 27, 2010? What was different from what you saw or researched in your previous book, Learning from Catastrophes?

ERWANN: Before we talk about the earthquake itself, let me note that the number of catastrophes and crises have grown rapidly in recent years around the world whether it’s natural disasters, terrorism, epidemics, or cyber-attacks. The likelihood that leaders are going to have to manage one of these crises when in office is much higher than before. It’s important for readers to understand we are living in a new era of catastrophes. For that very reason the lessons learned here in Chile are so relevant for the entire world.

First off, it is important to remember the context of the earthquake. Sebastián Piñera had just been elected president. In fact, he was not yet in office when one of the strongest earthquakes ever recorded on the planet struck Chile. The earthquake was so powerful that NASA estimated that it moved the country eleven inches and also tilted the axis of the planet by three inches. So that was his gift as a new president. It makes for a great leadership case, so to speak.

What we witnessed and wrote about in the book are two aspects of tiered leadership. One is the power of the president to exert leadership and two is the role of institutions in Chile in managing this crisis. It’s important to have great leaders, but if you don’t have the institutions in place, it’s hard to do anything. For instance, after an earthquake, there are many costs such as strong building codes that have to be enforced. It was crucial to the success in Chile that the country was able to pay a large part of the costs through insurance as this enabled the president and his cabinet to spend most of their time and leadership on other things, rather than raising money for these repairs.

In the book, we talk a lot about two drivers, leadership and action, but also about the existence of strong institutions here in Chile. To be successful it’s hard to have one without the other. When you have both that’s a powerful engine for good things to happen.

ALDO: Thank you. Mike?

MIKE: Just to offer a thought on why we focused on Chile and this particular event. As Erwann said, this was one of the biggest earthquakes ever, number six among the top ten recorded earthquakes of all time. The cost of the earthquake was estimated to be around 18% of Chile’s GDP. By contrast in the U.S. the worst disaster we’ve faced, Hurricane Katrina, was about one percent of GDP. The terrible earthquake and tsunami in Japan was around four percent. So in a sense, Chile suffered 18 times more damage than we did with Katrina in the U.S. and four to five times more damage than Japan.
The doors of the country were opened to us and we were invited to take a look at what happened in the wake of this cataclysmic event. As we began our examination, we discovered that Chile recovered swiftly and fully in what amounts to an extraordinary comeback. After the earthquake a third of the school children were out of school because their schools had been severely or completely damaged. But within six weeks, all school children were back in class. Within four years, bridges were rebuilt, roads repaired, and above and beyond that, the early-warning system for future disasters was radically improved. Structures along the coast that could be affected by a tsunami were extensively strengthened. Unemployment actually began to drop. Economic growth began to increase. When an earthquake severely shocks the economy, the debt raters that look at sovereign debt issues forecast a country’s ability to repay debt. The debt raters actually upgraded Chile, unlike Japan which they downgraded after its terrible earthquake. So in effect, in Chile, it was a case of full recovery plus in just four years.

Erwann and I and our third colleague, Howard Kunreuther, thought that was an amazing comeback, a truly stunning recovery. The country managed to put in place much more than it had to begin with. So the research question for us was: What accounted for that?

The three of us come to our research from different perspectives. I tend to focus on leadership and decision making. Erwann and Howard touch on those issues but are especially concerned with risk, its mitigation, and recovery from all kinds of setbacks including catastrophes like this one. Putting our thinking together, we came to Chile several times to delve into how the country managed its recovery. President Piñera opened up his office and his cabinet to us. We were able to travel with him — although you, Aldo, know that very well since you traveled with us — when he visited some of the areas severely affected by the earthquake.

In collecting research data from a number of sources, we concluded that the recovery was due to the combination of these two separate and powerful platforms for recovery. First, there was the national leadership and action rendered by President Piñera and his cabinet as well as many other groups, private companies, and non-government organizations. People had a vision of where they wanted to take things and did not hesitate to move forward. In addition, Chile has a long and enviable record, the reign of Augusto Pinochet notwithstanding, of the rule of law. In the last 20 years, Chile by any ranking, including those of the World Bank and the UN, stands out for its institutional values, rule of law, payment of taxes, and fairness in judicial decisions.

To sum it up, the recovery was due, first to a very strong, very decisive individual leader and leadership nationally by many other individuals and groups, and, second, to a set of values deeply accepted by the seventeen million people in Chile, creating a powerful combination for comeback.

**ALDO:** This brings up a number of questions: What was the initial response and the overall governmental role? With the change in administrations — with one government leaving and another government of the opposite political side taking over, what role did the NGOs play and did they lead first?

**MIKE:** In looking at Chile’s recovery, I think we’re all left a little bit more optimistic about the human condition. Of the seventeen million people in the country, it’s estimated that at least half, maybe even two-thirds, were directly affected by the shocks of this earthquake. The power was out. The internet was down. Bridges collapsed. The famous Pan-American Highway was severed in many places. The existing government and the new government that came in just twelve days later made recovery a priority and committed itself to using all of its resources for recovery — rebuilding hospitals, airport terminals, and schools.

Many of the people sitting in restaurants on main avenues in Santiago, and elsewhere, were as horrified as anybody about what had happened to their country. Even though they weren’t necessarily directly affected, many people said, “I’ve got to do something. The government is doing what it can do. Is there something that I can do? I’m going to travel to the area that was most impacted and — this is a good principle here — let’s find out what people need and see what I can do.” Many decided to give up their daily responsibilities for six months, even a year. A number of NGOs did exactly that as well.

**ERWANN:** When we think about leadership, we tend to identify leadership as actions by one individual. In that case, the first individual would be the president. But in Chile, leadership also came at all levels of decision making: the NGO’s, the private sector, average citizens, and religious organizations. The spirit of building back was really strong across the board. It’s not unusual to see that spirit when catastrophe occurs in other countries. Typically though, that spirit is only maintained for a few weeks when the emotion is still high. Then many people go back to their daily lives. In Chile that commitment lasted for months and months and months. All the people we talked to told us that it was the right thing to do and there was no choice. Deep inside they knew they had to do it.
MIKE: I’ll add two brief illustrations here. One NGO we focused on was led by several people who visited the most stricken area to work on helping fishermen whose boats were massively wiped out by the huge tsunami that swept in along the coast. Here the issue was the means of production. You can’t fish without a fishing boat. The fishing fleet was wiped out, and there were virtually no boats anywhere in reserve — nor even engines to construct new boats. This NGO talked with a number of people who made fishing their living and said, “We’re going to sit down and we’re going to work with them. We’re going to provide our labor. We’re going to bring in some of our money. We’re going to buy engines from all over the world and get these guys back out there before high season comes, which is when they make the majority of their income.”

Other NGO’s realized that there were probably close to a million people now living without shelter in the aftermath of the event. Several of these organizations began to provide temporary (and sometimes more than temporary) shelters — not with government money, but with their own resources and contributions they collected. Still another organization recognized that many people who now had to live outdoors did not know the basic rudiments of how to make living outdoors feasible. This NGO simply picked up from what they were doing, went to areas that the government was not able to reach, and provided the basics on how you start a campfire, how you ensure that your tents are not blown down at night, and how to make the best out of a temporary shelter. The NGOs’ work was very bottom up, very much at the grassroots.

ALDO: They responded faster in a way.

MIKE: Yes, they were able to respond faster and provide what was needed at the frontline.

ERWANN: They worked in partnership with the government to do what the government couldn’t do.

ALDO: What could the rest of the world learn from this? What, in your view, could we do better the next time around?

ERWANN: The first thing we, as an international community, can learn is the way in which the president immediately took over. We often talk about leadership as a description of a character, but in the case of Piñera, I think the biggest takeaway for me was that a lot of decisions that were made were extremely data-driven. Piñera and his team very quickly installed a system of metrics-based decision making that measured progress, set goals, and made all of that very transparent to the society which is rarely the case. Every month Piñera would sit down for a few hours with each one of his cabinet members to go over the data. It helped that Piñera was a businessman. He had a background in data-driven leadership.

Piñera created a dashboard of sorts to keep track of many different metrics. The metrics were also a way to keep track of his people and the actions of the second tier leadership, keeping them honest and on track to actually do the things they committed to. It was a very quantitative leadership style. So for anyone reading about this case that’s an interesting finding. One of the follow-up question becomes, how do you create these intensively data driven, decision making processes?

Another thing we talk about in the book is something that our colleague, Howard Kunreuther, often thinks about. This is inspired by some of the work that Daniel Kahneman, the Nobel Laureate, has done. Kahneman defines the way we, as human beings, think and make decisions as the tension between two dimensions — the intuitive and deliberate. With the intuitive dimension of decision making, you don’t think much about it. You focus on what makes good sense based on experience, emotions, and feelings — that’s the emotional
part of the brain. In contrast, the more deliberative part of the brain will say, “Let’s take a look at this data.” There’s always a tension between intuitive and deliberative decision making. Throughout the book, we describe instances where data was a big part of the equation and other times when there was more of a reliance on intuitive decision making. This is not to say that one is better than the other. This was a great case of these two kinds of decision making processes working together.

MIKE: In some respects, it is like Moneyball on steroids for politicians. In Michael Lewis’ book and then later the film, Moneyball, the Oakland A’s manager had a professional baseball team that was not doing well. Despite having a very small payroll, the team was able to do amazing things because they began to determine who was a good player as a function of the detailed performance data they had. They exploited the fact that they had the data to make more discerning judgments.

In the book, we go into the details of how President Piñera led the country. He brought to life that old phrase that we’ve always used in business, “You can’t manage something if you can’t measure it.” He took it to a new level by asking all the people, including his direct reports and his more than twenty cabinet members, to provide exquisitely specific, validated data on what they were doing, how they were going to do it, and when they were going to finish it. They had to produce that every month. They had to post it publicly. If they said, as they were pushed to do, “At the end of this month we’re going to repair this many bridges, put up this many new homes, open up this many old hospitals that have been repaired,” then they had to do it.

ALDO: The data helped provide accountability. It was not just some politicians’ promise.

MIKE: Exactly. The data doesn’t do anything unless you’ve got somebody who can apply it and then ensure that the people who are the next tier down can use it to make a difference and enact what they committed to do.

ALDO: Is there anything you could tell us that we should learn for the next time around, the next 8.8 earthquake. Anything we could do any better?

MIKE: I’ll start on that and then Erwann can jump in too. This is something that many people within the government have referenced. With this scale of reconstruction it was important to manage expectations on the pace, the cost, and what it would take to actually bring the country back to life. People do need to know when they can expect their home to be up, when they can expect the emergency room to be reopened, etc. One of the essential elements of great leadership is being able to help people become more optimistic when they’re on the overly-pessimistic side but also being able to help people become more realistic if they’re on the overly-optimistic side. That’s something that should be in a leader’s repertoire of required actions. In retrospect, a number of the people that we spent time with said they should have worked more on that.

ERWANN: Mike has a good point here. The other thing that came up was that most of the leaders in office at that time had no government experience. They either had been business leaders in their previous professional life or they were leading academics in their fields. They knew a lot about the topic, but they had never applied it to the entire nation, to the day-to-day political realities. On the one hand, you might think that this background is enough to run a country but then you discover that politics is also a part of the game. I think they learned pretty quickly that yes, they had won the election, but there was also something called the opposition or something called the media and these guys were going to ask them to do things twice as fast as they could possibly do it. They quickly realized that they needed professional politicians so they changed the cabinet to include two or three politicians.
The other lesson learned is if you’re an elected official and a big crisis happens, ask yourself whether you have the right mix of people and the right composition for your team. It’s like conducting the London Philharmonic with only violins. You can play certain compositions, but not all of them. So ask yourself, “Do I have the right people with the right expertise for this crisis? Do I have the right balance?” If your entire cabinet is made up of elected officials or politicians, maybe you need more technical, business, and get-the-job-done type of people. Maybe you need people, for example, who have been working in universities and who know the topic extremely well from a technical perspective. One thing we’ve learned is that a crisis doesn’t give people any opportunity to be wrong on the technical side. With crisis management of that magnitude, on every level, in every discipline, you have to have the best minds in order to make the decisions and do the work.

MIKE: Aldo, to add on to the formula of what we think was vital for the leadership of the country, we also looked at the subsequent disaster which came about five months later. On August 5th, 2010, 33 miners were trapped about a half mile below the surface with a massive cave-in above them. They were trapped in a private mine that the government regulated but did not run. Nonetheless, Laurence Golborne, the Minister of Mining, reported the situation to President Piñera and he very quickly decided that the mining owners did not have the resources or the know-how to reach the trapped miners. Piñera and Golborne knew from their experience of the earthquake that not hesitating, that being decisive and getting in and facing the problem was vital. They applied the same mindset of the importance of getting into the game even if they were not formally or fully in charge and making a difference.

ALDO: They also did a lot better at managing expectations with the mining disaster.

MIKE: Indeed, they had learned — which serves as a good reminder that leadership and learning to lead is a lifelong process. With the miners, Piñera and Golborne leaned over backwards to say, “Don’t get your hopes up everybody. It will be a long process. It might take until December to get the miners out.” Then, when the miners came up on October 12th and 13th, they beat the expectations that the nation’s leaders had helped shaped. It’s always better to be on the side of exceeding expectations than falling short of expectations. Their learning is a great point and part of a broader point. One of the reasons we wrote the book was we wanted to learn what made the difference in successful crisis management, so that people from all over could learn from it and become better leaders for it.

ERWANN: The book is a very affirmative story. Typically when a crisis happens — and I’m not talking about Chile, I’m talking about what we have seen around the world — there is a big political mess. Then a national commission is established whose only job, sadly, often ends up being having to blame someone. The commissions will all say what went wrong — because typically things do go wrong. But this is one of the rare instances in recent history where you actually can tell a very positive story of something that was almost impossible to do. Chile is one of the rare instances around the world where there was a positive outcome. This is why our subtitle is “Chile’s Extraordinary Comeback from Disaster”.

ALDO: Without your help and making the comparison, we would have never thought the earthquake’s devastation was 18% of the GDP. It may be what they calculated, but we didn’t really realize how big it was.

ERWANN: That’s the other component leadership to consider: leadership at what level and what metrics do you consider? As a citizen, maybe you don’t hear about the 18% GDP loss because you don’t really care about the economics or maybe you’re a medical doctor and your focus is on saving people and helping the first responders.

But, if you’re the president of a country or the CEO of a company or you run your NGO, you can’t just look at one or two metrics. Your indicator, your dashboard is made of dozens of them, which makes your life a little bit more complicated. The comparison I make is the difference between driving your car and piloting an aircraft. How many metrics do you have on your car dashboard? The speed, temperature, gas, and maybe a few more these days because people are fancy. But if you’re a pilot, when you enter the cockpit of an airplane, immediately you see the difference. Pilots need and use many more metrics, because they are in a three-dimensional space, not simply on the road. In this book, we stepped back and tried to look at it with as many lenses as possible because that’s what a president or a prime minister has to do. What do you think, Mike?

MIKE: Picking up on that thought, we were struck by the way the miners were finally brought to the surface. It was watched by one of the biggest audiences ever in television history, probably many of the readers of this interview saw it. More than a billion people were estimated to have seen — on live TV, not a recording — at least one of the 33 miners come to the surface. What helped to make that happen? Three separate leaders in different worlds combined what they could do to make the difference.
To begin at the lowest layer physically, so to speak, is Luis Urzua, the shift superintendent. He was in the mine when it collapsed and with a couple of others spent an enormous amount of time ensuring that the trapped miners were able to physically and mentally survive under the most appalling of conditions. He gets enormous credit for that. The next layer up, on the surface, was Laurence Golborne, the Minister of Mining. He moved from Santiago up to the north in the Atacama where the mine was located and was directly involved in managing and leading the drilling process. One layer higher, back in Santiago was President Piñera. He called the U.S. White House asking, “Can you help our country out? We know there’s a mining company in Pennsylvania that has some special equipment that would hopefully get down to the miners before they run out of everything.” The White House, as the account goes, called back an hour later and said, “We’ve got the equipment and UPS has agreed to deliver it airfreighted down there.”

What brought the miners up alive? Well, what kept them alive down below was the survival leadership of one person. On the surface it was the drilling leadership of another. Then, at the next tier above, the national leadership of the president was vital as well. Without all three tiers working together, those miners would not have been retrieved alive. That’s why we come back to this idea of tiered leadership. It’s an understanding that leadership is not just the top man or woman; it’s a series of layers that have to work exquisitely well together.

ALDO: Especially in the first days of a crisis. All the regions have a local emergency group made up of politicians, firefighters, and business people. They held everything together, more or less, until the communications were restored.

MIKE: Great point. Regional authorities couldn’t and didn’t wait. They began to organize themselves. Then NGOs came in and a good number of private companies also stepped forward. They formed a complex partnership with leadership coming from many different directions.

ALDO: Exactly. It was not as if one level took over. It was like you said, Erwann, it was more of a partnership.

ERWANN: There is yet another element here. Expecting the president to do all of the above is asking him to be almost super-human. People don’t talk about leadership as something that’s tiring, but physically these situations are draining. The physical aspect of leading during a crisis is something that’s often underestimated. Try to make decisions for your family or your kids after two nights without sleeping. You’ll see what mental shape you are in. Now imagine if you don’t sleep for three nights in a row and then someone asks you to make decisions for your country. That’s literally what they had to do for at least a year or two.

MIKE: Leadership is a combination of knowing where you want to go, having the strategy for getting there, and being a good decision maker and persuasive communicator. But, personal resilience is part of the equation too.

ALDO: Piñera was famously quoted for calling people 24/7 and being available 24/7. Let’s move into the process of writing the book. I know this book was not easy to produce. In part, you were trying to make it an extension of Mike and Howard’s earlier book Learning from Catastrophes: Strategies for Reaction and Response. You sent a team of students to survey the Chilean earthquake and, through an interview I arranged, talk to Claudio Seebach — a consultant in strategic management in Latin America. But it was difficult to gain access to Piñera until he appeared in a photo reading Learning from Catastrophes.

MIKE: Speaking of leadership coming from many different places. Aldo, you, Rodrigo Jordan, Penny Bember, and
three or four others, were there too. Without any one of you opening the doors for us, I’m not certain we could have actually achieved the kind of insights we had. So thank you for that.

**ALDO:** It was a series of fortunate coincidences. You were invited to lecture in Chile by another organization. I had to fight with the CEO of that company to have you meet President Piñera. I said “The president wants to meet Michael Useem. He’s going to come to Chile the day before the president is doing a survey in the south. Do you mind if we pay for his airfares and expenses, and take him down there?” He turned down the idea. He had a dinner planned for you and did not want to cancel. But then I said, “Okay, I’m going to tell the president that you don’t want Michael Useem to go with him on the plane.” He said, “Oh, you’re going to do that?” He quickly changed his mind.

**MIKE:** Aldo, you were absolutely fantastic. Number one, when I came off the American Airlines’ flight, you had arranged for me to go through the VIP passport control. It took all of about four seconds and customs took another two seconds. I was out of the airport by far the fastest I’ve ever been by a factor of about ten. Then we were in a car driving around the perimeter of the Santiago main airport. The next thing I knew, an official in uniform is opening the car door and we’re walked out to what Americans would reference as Air Force One, the presidential jet which was preparing to fly down to the affected region.

Aldo joined us and we were able to witness in action President Piñera opening up a housing complex that government monies had rebuilt. I’ve got to tell you that the residents there were delighted that they had a great new home. It was an opportunity for our team to see directly leadership in action and to witness how, several years after the earthquake, the president had evolved in his thinking about this issue of managing expectations. As he helped open this project, there were several hundred residents there and the media was amply visible and present. He recited the terrible facts of the tragedy and then he thanked the Chilean people for their patience in ensuring that when they rebuilt the homes they didn’t do it shabbily, but did it completely and in a way that people wanted, ensuring that they could live where they’ve always lived.

**ALDO:** They received a lot of pressure from the construction industry in Chile who said, “Okay, in six months we’ll have a hundred and eighty-thousand houses, thirty-thousand ghost towns spread around the country.” But the president said, “No, we don’t want that.” It’s cheaper to build that way, but then you have to create big transportation systems to move the people around to their jobs.

**ERWANN:** It’s tough too because understandably people want their homes back now. That’s where being the captain of the ship means being able to say “no” sometimes. To say, “No, it’s in everyone’s best interests to build stronger and to build better against possible future events.” Chile has been lucky. For the four years during the Piñera administration there hasn’t been another major earthquake. By way of comparison, in New Zealand in September, 2010 there was a big earthquake in Christchurch followed by, literally, hundreds of other earthquakes and then another big one in February 2011. Think about what it means in terms of emergency services and reconstruction if for four months you keep having earthquakes one after another. Building better is just as important as building quickly, if not more.

**MIKE:** It raises a fundamental point about anybody that carries responsibility whether it’s a country, a community, or a company. You have to make swift decisions that are focused on the here and now. That’s what the NGOs, companies, regional government, and national government did. People need water. People need food. They need communications and the internet back. But they also need roads to be reconstructed. They need houses to be rebuilt. The pressure was enormous to rebuild right away. But it’s the responsibility of leaders to think beyond what’s needed right now and to wonder “What do we need in five years?” We need earthquake resistant structures. We need homes that are not in a tsunami zone.

**ALDO:** We need stronger emergency offices.

**MIKE:** Exactly. We need better early warning systems for disasters. That’s what the Chilean government did. We already referenced Daniel Kahneman. In his book *Thinking Fast and Slow*, he argues that you need to think fast and be decisive, but you also need to think slow and be careful and deliberative. In the Chilean recovery, there’s evidence of both those ways of thinking.

**ERWANN:** Just to circle back, I think we have indeed been very lucky in researching and writing this book. Chileans have been fantastic at opening their doors so we had access to all the possible data you can think of in a very transparent way. A series of fortunate events, connections, and friends made this possible, including having the president as interested in having us work on that case as we were. As always in life it was a combination of many things converging to an unlikely event — this book — and maybe
that’s why you don’t see many books like this. In a way it is a very unique story told very soon after a disaster. It is not every day that there’s a disaster and we can call up the president of the country and say we’re going to come and work with you for three years. But when it happens it gives us so much knowledge from which other heads of states can benefit.

ALDO: Your longtime relationship with the World Economic Forum also helped.

ERWANN: Yes, that’s where all of this aligned really well. A few phone calls were made to the World Economic Forum to check whether we were the right people for the job, so to speak. The three of us have been working with the forum for over ten years on a very, very regular basis since the Wharton Risk Center has been the partner of the WEF on the, now very influential, Global Risk Report since its inception in 2004, and all of us have been active on Global Agenda Councils of the Forum, etcetera. So the planets were aligned.

ALDO: I think the fact that the Chileans were getting involved in the World Economic Forum more actively also helped them become part of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2010.

ERWANN: Right. As Chairman of the OECD Secretary-General Board on Financial Management of Catastrophes I was delighted to see this happen. Chile became a member in 2010. Why is that a big deal? Because Chile became the first Latin American country to become a member. Obviously you think about the U.S., France, Germany, and Japan for the OECD, so it’s a great recognition of what the world thinks about Chile, about what it has accomplished. It’s pretty tough to become a member of the OECD.

MIKE: Going back to our earlier points about the rule of law and the institutional values in Chile, it recognizes that the government is well-rounded.

ERWANN: It is a long process to become part of the OECD. There have been several countries that have been in the ascension process without becoming members. Chile didn’t become part of the OECD because of the earthquake management, but the great management of the earthquake was a confirmation of the indicators that the countries are measured against. What does that mean for Chile? It means that Chile has been recognized as a peer in a fairly select group of countries.

ALDO: OECD has gone mainstream here. All of the newspapers picked it up and reported Chile’s ranking. We’re the poorest member, almost last in some areas such as the ability to read, and are halfway on the list for things such as car insurance. Some of those things are items we’ve never really looked at when measuring ourselves. We are now doing this because the OECD asked us to follow these common guidelines. Our experts are all stressed out about being greener, more sustainable, paying their taxes, etcetera.

ERWANN: The “recommendations” of the OECD are the highest legal document of the organization. In 2009, before Chile’s earthquake, a group of us were asked by the Secretary General of OECD to draft the recommendations for good disaster management. Then it went through the process of being validated at the Council of the OECD. After the earthquake and recovery happened, I looked back at what we had established, as an organization, about good practices and you could literally go down the list and tick the box for how Chile had managed all aspects of the crisis. It was quite a sign of how Chile handled the earthquake. We have been lucky to be at the center of this amazing story and we’re so happy to be here in Santiago tonight talking with you.

ALDO: Thank you both for your time and for sharing this story. It’s a wonderful book with leadership lessons for people around the world.

MIKE: Thank you, Aldo. Just to say it again, we would not have been able to write the book the way that we did without your help along the way. You opened up the right doors for us. Muchas Gracias.